



An Anticipative Feedback Solution for the Infinite-Horizon, Linear-Quadratic, Dynamic, Stackelberg Game

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BiblioGov. Paperback. Book Condition: New. This item is printed on demand. Paperback. 34 pages. Dimensions: 9.7in. x 7.4in. x 0.1in. This paper derives and illustrates a new suboptimal-consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. This solution lies in the same solution space as the infinite-horizon, dynamic-programming, feedback solution but puts the leader in a preferred equilibrium position. The idea comes from Kydland (1977) who suggested deriving a consistent feedback solution for an infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game by varying the coefficients in the players linear constant-coefficient decision rules. Here feedback is understood in the sense of setting a current control vector as a function of a predetermined state vector. The proposed solution is derived for discrete- and continuous-time games and is called the anticipative feedback solution. The solution is illustrated with a numerical example of a duopoly model. This item ships from La Vergne, TN. Paperback.



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